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Abstract
In this paper, we consider two firms diffusing incompatible technologies and their
decision of consumer targeting. The technology adoption is made in two steps. First,
once the firms sell their products to their respective targeted consumer, the technology
is diffused successively by word-of-mouth communication from the initial consumer to
other consumers linked along the network. Then, in the second step, each consumer
imitates the technology the neighbors use which fares better, and through this process
of imitation, the technology distribution keeps evolving until it reaches the long-run
steady state. We demonstrate that the early entrant chooses the minmax location
when firms are myopic in the sense that they do not take the imitation possibility into
account. If firms consider the possibility of imitation, the best target will tend towards
a hub, although the minmax principle in general keeps valid in the sense that it should
be the minmax location after considering imitation.
Keywords: Information Diffusion, Technology Adoption, Network Externalities, Com-
patibility, Learning, Evolution, Targeted Marketing
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1 Introduction
Technologies are evolving. An old technology soon faces competition by the emergence of a
new technology. It may be replaced by the new superior technology or they may coexist for a
while. If the competing technologies are not compatible with each other, a consumer should
be concerned about how many neighbors share the technology in deciding which technology
to adopt. The more neighbors use the technology, the higher utility a consumer usually gets
by adopting it. This is called network externality.1
In the description above, special attention should be paid to the word “neighbor.” If
a consumer meets only a limited set of the whole population, the total number of users
adopting the same technology is not meaningful to him. He only needs to care about the
technologies adopted by his neighbors, that is, those whom he interacts with. This implies
that the structure of the network among consumers in which they interact with each other is
an important factor to be considered in deciding which technology to adopt in the presence
of network externalities. However, the explicit structure of the consumer network has been
largely ignored in literature on technology adoption.
The network structure is crucial not only to consumers but also to the firms sponsoring
the technologies. As long as the technologies are diffused by word-of-mouth communication
between consumers along the consumer network, it is important for a firm to target a right
consumer so as to maximize its market share.
In this paper, we consider two competing firms sponsoring incompatible technologies
and their decision of consumer targeting. We also consider the subsequent diffusion and
evolution of technologies. The technology adoption is made in two steps. First, once the
firms sell their products to their respective targeted consumer, the technology is diffused by
word-of-mouth communication from the initial consumer to other consumers linked along
the network subsequently. Then, in the second step, each consumer imitates the technology
the neighbors use which fares better, and through this process of imitation, the technology
distribution keeps evolving until it reaches the long-run steady state.
The economists’ interest in the consumer network has begun only recently. Jun and Kim
(2008) seems the first paper to consider the consumer network explicitly. They consider the
monopolist’s problem of choosing the referral fee to provide consumers incentives enough to
make the information about its products spread widely. Subsequently, Jun et al. (2006a,
1This concept has been actively explored in the context of technology compatibility (standardization) by
economists since David (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985).
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2006b) consider similar problems in small world networks. Also, Kim (2010) considers the
targeting decision of a monopolist whose objective is to maximize its discounted sum of
values generated from the information diffusion. Since a single decision maker is involved in
the paper, there is no strategic aspect to be considered. This paper is an extension of Kim
(2010) into a duopoly setting.2
Recently, Duan et al. (2005) investigate a targeting strategy for the spread of opinions,
diseases, new ideas, technological innovations, etc. in scale-free social networks. They are
mainly interested in how to pick out a given multiple number of agents as initial targets in
order to launch a spreading process efficiently, and propose a strategy of targeting agents
with most connections (hubs) as initial adopters, so-called hub strategy. In this paper, we
investigate the targeting strategies of competing technologies and the resulting technology
diffusion in an agent-based model by focusing more on the micro motivation of agents,3
and establish the minmax principle in competitive targeting. If two firms with sequentially
developed technology compete in targets, the first firm does not target naively as if he were
a single player, but chooses its target by considering its effect on the second firm’s decision.
The second firm’s decision is naturally affected by the first firm’s targeting decision. Then,
the optimum for the first firm is to choose the minmax node, i.e., the node to minimize
the maximum of the rival’s market share. The main insights of this paper, however, can be
straightforwardly applied to the opinion formation and others, as we will argue later.
Some could be learned from the previous works on the epidemic spreading and the efficient
immunization strategies on the complex networks.4 For example, the targeted immunization
strategy turns out to be more efficient to prevent the disease spreading than the random
immunization strategy on the scale-free networks. Duan et al. (2005) modified the strategy
by targeting the higher degree nodes with higher probability. While all those works consider
the diffusion of one kind of technology (monopoly), we take into account the competition
between two incompatible technologies, which makes the problem qualitatively different. On
the other hand, Newman (2005) studied the case in which after one pathogen spreads first on
2We found the paper by Galeotti and Goyal (2009) which also addressed a problem of targeting in the
consumer network. However, this paper mainly considers monopoly targeting, not competitive targeting.
3Many opinion dynamics models studied by the physicists usually simply assume the compromise process
between the agents, as in the voter model (See, for example, Liggett [1999]) and the Sznajd model See
Sznajd [2000, 2005]) without paying enough attention to the agents’ economic motivation. This might lead
to misunderstanding when applied to economic phenomena.
4For example, see Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani (2002), Havlin et al. (2003) and Jo et al. (2006).
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a network, then the other pathogen spreads over the remaining population of that network.
Our paper is also distinguished from the work in the sense that we consider the concurrent
diffusions of two sequentially developed technologies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and provide its
economic rationale. In Section 3, we consider the firms’ targeting decision and the conse-
quent technology diffusion process when the network is a tree. In Section 4, we discuss the
case of more general networks and provide some simulation results. Section 5 contains the
conclusion.
2 Model and Economic Rationale
We consider only the connected network consisting of N nodes. Each node represents a con-
sumer, who is a potential technology user. Two firms are going to introduce two technologies
which are incompatible to each other. We will call the technology introduced by firm A and
B technology A and B respectively. The firms can diffuse their technology by choosing a
node as the starting consumer. To avoid uncertainty due to simultaneity, we favor firm A
by giving him the first mover advantage. That is, we assume that firm A first chooses a
node iA to diffuse its technology and then firm B chooses a target node iB. Considering the
reality that two competing technologies are rarely introduced simultaneously, it is a realistic
assumption.
The subsequent interaction among technology users consists of two stages, each of which
again consists of multi-periods. The first stage is the technology diffusion stage. Once a
node adopts a technology α ∈ {A,B}, he passes the information on the technology to all
his neighbors in the period. Then, the neighbors in turn inform the technology to all their
neighbors in the next period, and so one. This diffusion process is proceeded until no one
remains uninformed. In other words, given the initial targets of two technologies (iA, iB), the
technology of node i will be αi = argminα∈{A,B} d(i, iα), where d(i, j) is the shortest path
length between nodes i and j. If node i receives the information on the two technologies
at the same time, i.e. d(i, iA) = d(i, iB), we assume that he adopts the technology A with
probability p ∈ [0, 1].5
The second stage is the technology imitation stage. Once the diffusion of the technologies
5More realistically one may assume that the probability depends positively on the number of neighbors
using the same technology. However, for the complexity reason, we do not consider the case in this paper.
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is completed, each pair of nodes linked with each other play the 2 × 2 game in which both
users obtain a positive payoff a (b respectively) if they choose the same technologies A
(B respectively) and both obtains zero otherwise.6 The structure implies that the two
technologies exhibit network externalities.7 After playing the 2×2 game, each user compares
the average payoff of his A-neighbors and B-neighbors including his own payoff, and imitates
the technology yielding the higher average payoff. After the transient periods the system will
be stationary, resulting in the stationary population distribution of users of each technology.
The imitation dynamics is described precisely. Let t = 0 be the period at which tech-
nology diffusion is completed and let NA(t) be the number of users adopting technology A
at period t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Then NB(t) = N − NA(t). Let us denote the sets of a node i’s
A-neighbors and B-neighbors as NAi and N
B
i respectively. Then Ni = N
A
i ∪ NBi . From
kAi ≡ |NAi | and kBi ≡ |NBi |, the node i’s degree is ki = kAi +kBi . If the node i adopts technol-
ogy A, i.e. αi = A, his payoff is given by pii =
kAi
ki
a. Similarly, if αi = B, then pii =
kBi
ki
b. Only
the node having both A-neighbors and B-neighbors has the chance to switch its technology.
If αi = A, the node i switches to B if and only if∑
l∈NAi ∪{i} pil
kAi + 1
<
∑
l∈NBi pil
kBi
, (1)
and similarly, if αj = B for node j, he switches to A if and only if∑
l∈NAj pil
kAj
>
∑
l∈NBj ∪{j} pil
kBj + 1
. (2)
By applying the Bethe approximation we briefly analyze how the imitation dynamics
depends on the degrees of involved nodes. Consider a node i with αi = A is connected with
6An earlier evolutionary approach to the technology adoption game can be found in Kandori and Rob
(1998). However, in their model, a pair of players playing the 2 × 2 game are randomly matched from the
whole population, not locally matched on a network. Thus, the set of players each player is expected to play
the 2 × 2 game is the same in their model, while each player plays the game with a different set of players
in our model. Another difference is that the proportion of each type evolves according to the best response
dynamics in their model, while it evolves according to the imitation dynamics. Consequently, in this model,
if the network is complete, each player will play with the same group of players as in their model, but the
imitation process will be different from theirs.
7This payoff structure can be used for opinion formation. Suppose there are two conflicting views and
imagine that the interaction between two individuals with similar opinions reinforces the belief of each other,
while the (one-time) interaction between individuals with differing opinions yields only quarrel with no utility.
If one view, say A, is more convincing than the other, say B, then the former will have a stronger reinforcing
effect in the sense that a > b.
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kAi A-neighbors and k
B
i B-neighbors. We assume for simplicity that each A-neighbor of node
i, say l, has kl neighbors and those next nearest neighbors adopt either A or B with the
probabilities ρ = N
A
N
and 1 − ρ. Similarly we assume that each B-neighbor of node i, say
j, has kj neighbors and those next nearest neighbors adopt one of technologies in the same
way. Since pii =
kAi
ki
a, pil =
(kl−1)ρ+1
kl
a, and pij =
(kj−1)(1−ρ)
kj
b, the condition (??) for switching
from A to B yields
kAi pil + pii
kAi + 1
<
kBi pij
kBi
,
i.e.,
kAi
kAi + 1
[
1
ki
+
(kl − 1)ρ+ 1
kl
]
a <
kj − 1
kj
(1− ρ)b. (3)
Combined with the condition from (??), one can roughly say node i is more likely to invade
or less likely to be invaded as the number of the same type neighbors, kAi , is larger and the
degree of the opposite type neighbors, kj, is smaller. Let a link connecting i with αi = A
and j with αj = B on a tree network be the unique bridge between A-cluster and B-cluster,
implying that without that link, the tree will be split into two clusters of each own type.
Then the condition (??) reduces to
k2i − 1
k2i
a <
kj − 1
kj
b. (4)
Since ki = k
A
i + 1, the above analysis is clarified in this case.
The objective of each firm is to maximize the number of its technology users by targeting
its starting user optimally. For the subsequent analysis, we assume that there is no discount
in the profit of firms.8 This assumption implies that firms care only about the stationary
distribution, that is, cares only about the profit in the long-run future state with ignoring the
profit in the transient periods. To isolate the targeting decisions from other strategic effects,
we are also implicitly assuming that there is no price competition. If each firm can choose
its price as well as its target, the imitation decision of consumers will depend on the prices
as well. Then, the second firm may try to invade consumers using the rival’s technology by
charging a lower price than the rival. Thus, there will be a strategic interaction between
8The assumption of no discounting might be challenged. If the evolution phase is too long, firms may care
about the profits realized before the steady state is reached. However, if we consider discounting explicitly,
the optimal targeting decision will depend on the discounting factor as well, which complicates the prediction.
See Kim (2010) for the the targeting decision of a monopolist who takes discounting into account.
6
firms in pricing. Although this is an interesting economic problem, it is beyond the scope of
this paper.
3 Consumer Targeting in a Tree
The targeting decision of the firms induces a partition of users, each of which uses the same
technology as a consequence of information diffusion. Let P and P ′ be two partitions. Note
that a partition is entirely determined by the set of users adopting technology A. Accordingly,
let A(P) be the users adopting technology A in P .
A firm’s preference over partitions is denoted by %. That is, P %A P ′ implies that firm
A prefers P to P ′, and P ∼A P ′ implies that firm A is indifferent between P and P ′. By the
constant-sum nature, i.e., NA +NB = N , P %A P ′ implies that P ′ %B P .
We consider two cases. One is the case that firms are myopic so that they do not consider
the possibility of technology imitation in their targeting decisions. The other is the case of
sophisticated (far-sighted) firms who make targeting decisions by considering the subsequent
imitation process.
In this section, the analysis will be restricted to tree networks. Consumer targeting in
more general networks will be discussed in the next section.
3.1 Myopic Firms
Given the sequential nature of targeting, we first consider the decision of the entrant firm
B. Let i∗B(i) be the best response of firm B to A’s target i.
Lemma 1 For any iA = i, d(i, i
∗
B) = 1.
This lemma implies that the targets of the firms must be minimally differentiated. The
intuition is that a firm always prefers being more closely located to the opponent in order
to secure more customers.
Proposition 1 Given any iA = i, {i∗B(i)} = argmaxj∈Ni |Sij|.
Here Sij denotes a set of node j’s successors against node i.
Now, consider incumbent A’s decision. Letting i∗A be the optimal target, we have the
following proposition.
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Proposition 2 {i∗A} = argmini∈N maxj∈Ni |Sij|.
This proposition says that it is optimal for firm A to take the minmax strategy. For
example, in a line network with N = 2m + 1 for some positive integer m illustrated in
Figure 1(a), i∗A = m+ 1. Note that this target does not necessarily correspond to a hub, as
illustrated in Figure 1(b). In Figure 1(b), firm A will target node 5, although node 4 is the
hub with the highest degree.
3.2 Sophisticated Firms
If firms are sophisticated, they choose their targets not simply by maximizing the current
market share, but by taking the subsequent imitation process into account. Thus, it is not
straightforward to compare their preference between two partitions. However, the following
proposition simplifies the process of searching for the optimal target.
Proposition 3 Suppose iA = i1, i2 induce P1 = {A1, B1} and P2 = {A2, B2} respectively.
When firms are sophisticated, A1 ⊃ A2 implies that P1 %A P2.
Proposition 3 says that sophisticated firms prefer a larger installed base even if they take
into account the possibility that the imitation process will lead to a different market share
ultimately. Due to this proposition, it is easy to see that Lemma 1 still holds in the case of
sophisticated firms. To see this, suppose d(i, i∗B(i)) ≥ 2 for some node i. Now, alternatively
take iB = j where d(i, j) = 1 and j ∈ qi,i∗B , where qi,j denotes a path from i to j. Then,
clearly, the partition induced by the latter choice is preferred by the entrant B. However,
Proposition 1 does not hold any more. To see this, consider Figure 1(c). Assuming a < b,
given that iA = 6, if firm B enters iB = 7, technology B cannot invade iA if a > 2b/3. If
firm B enters iB = 5 instead, it can invade node 6 if (2b/3 <) a < 8b/9. This implies that
it can be optimal for firm B to enter node 5 even if i∗B(6) = 7 in the case of myopic firms.
The main insight is that node 5 has more neighbors so as to be advantageous for invasion.
A similar intuition will be provided for the targeting decision of firm A. Take the example
of the network in Figure 1(d) and assume that the value of a = 1 and b = 1.5 − ². If firms
are myopic, (i∗A, i
∗
B) = (9, 4) as we showed. But, then, nodes 8 and 9 of type A are invaded
by type B. Ultimately, the market share of firm A will end up with 6/15. However, if firm A
targets node 4, node 4 of type A is not invaded and the resultant market share of firm A is
7/15. Thus, node 4 is preferable to firm A. The intuition is as follows. For a node of firm A
not to be invaded, it is better that the opponent node has less neighbors. Note that node 4
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has a large number of neighbors making him faring very well regardless of the technology he
chooses. This implies that if firm A enters node 9, it will be very likely to be invaded. The
upshot is that if an early entrant expects to face a new entrant with superior technology,
it must keep the rival firm from entering the hub. Thus, it may be sometimes (not always)
good to preempt such a hub. If the incumbent has the superior technology, it may prefer
choosing the hub for a different reason that it is more advantageous for invasion.
The general conclusion is that firms want their target to have more neighbors and their
opponent’s target to have less neighbors in the invasion battle. More specifically, the firm
with a superior technology prefers entering the hub to invade neighbors more easily, while
the firm with an inferior technology would rather choose the node whose rival node has less
neighbors in order to be less vulnerable to the invasion.9 However, this does not imply that
the sophisticated firm always prefers the hub with the highest degree to the myopic optimal
targets. If the non-hub myopic targets are robust against invasion, there would be no reason
to give them up in order to preempt hub targets.
Generally, we can identify the optimal target of the two firms in the sophisticated case.
For given i, find i∗B(i) by the node j ∈ Ni that maximizes |S˜ji | where S˜ji is the set of B
technology users after the imitation is completed. The node j ∈ argmax |S˜ji | is an optimal
response of firm B. Then, an optimal target of firm A is i∗A ∈ argmini∈N maxj∈Ni |S˜ji |.
4 Discussion on Baraba´si-Albert Scale-Free Networks
We will briefly discuss the case of more general networks possibly containing a cycle. First
of all, Lemma 1 is not valid any more. For example, consider a circle. Once firm A chooses
a node in a circle, any other node is optimal to firm B. In any case, the two firms split the
consumers equally in the technology diffusion stage. Suppose d(iA, iB) = 2 in a circle graph
with N = 5. Then, by moving closer to iA, firm B may secure the node between them but
it loses other nodes in the opposite direction. In this case, note that node j is not critical in
the communication between iA and k 6= iA, iB, j. The fact that the path between two nodes
iA and iB is not unique causes Lemma 1 to fail. This observation forces us to search for firm
9We are saying that the reason for the hub preference is either defensive (for an inferior firm) or offensive
(for a superior firm), but this distinction is just an overall tendency, since the possibility of invasion depends
on the number of neighbors as well as the quality of technology. In other words, an inferior firm might prefer
a hub-like node for an offensive reason. This means that the two effects actually coexist. It is true, too, for
the case that the two technologies have the same quality, i.e., a = b.
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B’s optimal response to iA not only from the neighbors but globally from the population.
More specifically, for any (nonterminal) node i and for each j ∈ Ni, one can induce the
probability distribution over the technology distribution as the result of the naive diffusion
based on p, since the existence of a cycle makes it possible for two technologies to arrive
at a node simultaneously. Then, compute the expected number of successors Sˆji . Then, an
optimal target is i∗A ∈ argmini∈N maxj∈Ni |Sˆji |, which will be called the extended minmax
target.
We provide the simulation results in Figure 2 for N = 51. To generate networks, we
use two Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks.10 Two kinds of networks are considered; a tree
which are obtained by connecting each new node to only one existing node, and a general
network with cycles which are obtained by connecting each new node to two existing nodes.
Given the generated networks, we first simulate the technology diffusion process. Take
any pair of nodes and assign A and B to them respectively. In case of trees, it suffices to
take any pair of adjacent nodes. Then assign A to other nodes if they are closer to the initial
A node and assign B to nodes if they are closer to the initial B node. If the distances to the
initial A and the initial B are equal, just assign A (by assuming p = 1). Then, we simulate
the second stage technology imitation process by the random sequential updating method.
That is, at each time step of imitation process one randomly chosen node can be invaded
by its neighbors of different type. This randomness of choosing a node forces us to take the
average of the final market share. Thus, to find the minmax strategy of sophisticated firms
we compare the averaged market shares.
In Figures 2(a) and (b), the optimal targets are (iA, iB) = (3, 1) and (3, 7) when firms
are myopic and sophisticated, respectively. Note that k7 = 5 is larger than k1 = 3. This
supports our main insight that sophisticated firms tend to prefer nodes with higher degree.
In Figures 2(c) and (d), interestingly, the optimal targets for myopic firms are (4, 1) but the
optimal ones for sophisticated firms are reversed to (1, 4). Firm A, who is the earlier entrant,
can foresee that node 4 which is its optimal target in the myopic case will be invaded and
its resulting market share will be much lower than the rival’s market share. By preempting
node 1 instead of node 4, it can increase the number of its users from 11.22 to 11.44.
In Figure 3, we illustrate the tendency of sophisticated firms towards nodes with higher
degree more dramatically for a larger population N = 501. It shows a correlation between
the degree of the extended minmax target and the market share. Note that this result should
10See Baraba´si and Albert (1999).
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not be taken for granted, since it incorporates the concomitant effect of firm B’s optimal
response to firm A’s extended minmax target.
Figure 4 illustrates the correlation between the relative quality b/a and the market share
NA. It shows that the market share of technology A tends to decrease with b/a. This is not
surprising, since a technology will lose its market share more as the competing technology
has a higher quality. However, the figure also shows that the distribution of NA becomes
more dispersed as b/a increases, which is surprising. This is one consequence of the first-
mover advantage. One clear aspect of the first-mover advantage is that NA is much larger
than a half of the population (250) when a = b. Because of the severe advantage, the first
mover’s market share will mostly stay above 250 when b/a ≤ 1/2. This is the main reason
why the distribution of NA is so concentrated for low values of b/a. This is because high
assortativity weakens the first mover advantage.
Figure 5 shows the relationship between the degree of sophistication s and the market
share NA. By the degree of sophistication, we mean how far the firms foresee. For two
extreme cases, the myopic case corresponds to the case that s = 0 and the sophisticated
case corresponds to the case that s = 50. The horizontal line s of Figure 5 represents
how many rounds of the imitation process firms consider in deciding their target. The
figures show that NA changes monotonically with s. Note that there are two kinds of
advantages in this model; the quality advantage and the first-mover advantage. If a ≥ b,
technology A is clearly advantageous,11 while technology B is if b À a since its quality
advantage dominates the second-mover disadvantage. The advantages will become more
stark as the firms get more sophisticated (smart). Thus, as s gets higher, NA increases
monotonically if a ≥ b and decreases monotonically if a ¿ b. This is the case for both
assortative and disassortative networks while the tendency on assortative networks is weaker
than on disassortative networks. It is again because high assortativity weakens the first
mover advantage. We also find an exceptional case in Figure 5(c), where NA increases
slightly even when b/a = 1.4 for r = 0.3. This overall result extends the result of Duan et
al. showing a positive relationship between the identification ability and the contagion rate.
In this paper, the degree of sophistication is a counterpart for the identification ability and
the market share is one for the contagion rate. Figure 5 tells us that the result of Duan et
al. is carried over to the case of competitive targeting in the sense that the invasion rate of
11If a = b, technology A has no quality advantage, but still has the net advantage because it is the first
mover.
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the advantageous technology is higher as the firms are able to foresee farther.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the optimal targeting decisions of duopoly firms and obtained
the result that they must pay attention to the minmax node, not simply to a hub due to
the other competing firm’s response. The general insight provided in this paper and the
simulation method will help to better understand the evolution of competing technologies in
a local interaction market with network externalities.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let the induced technology partition be (A∗, B∗). Suppose d(i, i∗B) ≥
2. Then, there must be j ∈ qi,i∗B such that d(i, j) = 1. Now, suppose firm B chooses
j instead of i∗B as a target and let the induced partition be (A
′, B′). Since j is critical
in the communication between i and k for any k ∈ B∗ in the sense that i and k would be
disconnected without j, it follows that d(i, k) > d(j, k), implying that k ∈ B′ for any k ∈ B∗.
This in turn implies that B∗  B′ since j ∈ B′ but j 6∈ B∗. Thus, firm B prefers B′ to B∗.
Contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 1: From Lemma 1, it is clear that i∗B(i) ∈ Ni. It is trivial to see that it
must generate the largest set of his successors.
Proof of Proposition 2: This is trivial, since the game is a constant-sum.
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the set A1 \ A2. Let A˜2 = {k ∈ A1 \ A2 | k ← A2}. If
A˜2 ( A1 \A2, it is clear that A2∪ A˜2 ( (A1 \A2)∪A2 = A1. Then, it follows that P1 ÂA P2,
since inequality (4) implies that j ∈ B1 must be invaded for a larger set A1 whenever it
is invaded for a smaller set A2 ∪ A˜2. If A˜2 = A1 \ A2, we have P1 ∼A P2 by the Markov
property of the population distribution.
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Figure 1: Examples for (a) a line network, (b) non-hub target, (c) responses of a sophisticated
firm B, and (d) not a highest central target.
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Figure 2: Simulation results on the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks with N = 51 when
b/a = 1.4. Blue and red nodes denote A and B technologies, respectively. Only for the
tree, blue and red arrows denote the invasion direction of A and B, respectively. (a) For
myopic firms, (iA, iB) = (3, 1) results in (N
A, NB) = (39, 12). (b) For sophisticated firms,
(iA, iB) = (3, 7) results in (N
A, NB) = (14, 37). (c) For myopic firms, (iA, iB) = (4, 1)
results in (NA, NB) = (17.91, 33.09). (d) For sophisticated firms, (iA, iB) = (1, 4) results in
(NA, NB) = (19.89, 31.11). The final market shares were averaged over 103 realizations of
imitation dynamics. The networks have been produced with the PAJEK software.
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Figure 3: The correlations of the degree of A’s target, ki, and the A’s resulting market
share, NA, in case of sophisticated firms. We used (a)-(c) b/a = 0.6 and (d)-(f) b/a = 1.4 for
r = 0.3 (top), 0 (middle), and −0.3 (bottom). We used a scale-free network with N = 500
for each value of r.
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Figure 4: The dependence of NA on the ratio b/a for the sophisticated firms on the Baraba´si-
Albert scale-free networks with N = 500 over 20 different realizations of networks.
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Figure 5: The dependence of NA on the degree of sophistication s when (a)-(b) b/a = 1
and (c)-(d) b/a = 1.4 for r = 0.3 (top) and −0.3 (bottom). We used the Baraba´si-Albert
scale-free networks with N = 500 over 5 different realizations of networks (represented by
different colors). Each point was averaged over 50 realizations of imitation dynamics. s = 0
and s = 50 represent the myopic case and the sophisticated case, respectively.
20
